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Abstract
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are
not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research
agenda, initiated in Ferraioli and Ventre [2017], is to find a small (possibly, the smallest) set of conditions
allowing to implement an OSP mechanism. To this aim, we define a model of probabilistic verification
wherein agents are caught misbehaving with a certain probability, and show how OSP mechanisms can
implement every social choice function at the cost of either imposing very large fines for lies or verifying
a linear number of agents.
1 Introduction
Will people strategize against an incentive-compatible mechanism? The answer depends on whether they
will understand that doing so is against their own interest and, ultimately, on their rationality and cognitive
skills. This question has often been raised in literature (see, e.g., [Sandholm and Gilpin, 2003, Ferraioli
et al., 2015]) and much of the recent research in mechanism design is motivated by this question. Several
definitions for “simple” mechanisms have been recently given in literature: posted-price mechanisms and
variants [Chawla et al., 2010, Babaioff et al., 2014, Adamczyk et al., 2015], Bulow-Klemperer-like auctions
[Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009], verifiably truthful mechanisms [Braˆnzei and Procaccia, 2015]. This quest
for the right definition for simple mechanisms culminated with the introduction of obviously strategyproof
(OSP) mechanisms [Li, 2017].
Obvious strategyproofness focuses on how a mechanism is executed (e.g., English auction vs. sealed
bid second price auction), and requires that whenever an agent takes an action during the execution of the
mechanism, the “truthful behavior” must be dominant for that agent, even if no reasoning is done about
the future actions of the other agents. This concept is motivated by the experimental evidence that some
mechanism implementations (e.g., clock auction) are easier to understand than other theoretically equivalent
ones (e.g., sealed-bid auction). OSP mechanisms have also solid theoretical foundations: they are the only
ones that preserve the incentive-compatibility of agents who lack contingent reasoning skills [Li, 2017] and
they satisfy a natural generalization of standard decision theory axioms [Zhang and Levin, 2017].
This concept has attracted a considerable amount of recent work [Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2015, Bade
and Gonczarowski, 2017, Ferraioli and Ventre, 2017, Pycia and Troyan, 2016] that mainly focuses on the
properties and the limitations of these mechanisms. Of particular interest for our study are the results
proved by Ferraioli and Ventre [2017] showing that OSP mechanisms cannot have good approximation
guarantees for machine scheduling and facility location, two canonical optimization problems studied in
the area. However, monetary transfers are sufficient for the existence of optimal OSP mechanisms when
the designer can “monitor” all agents (meaning that a lying agent is artificially made to receive an utility
that is the worst between the one computed according to her true type and the one computed as if her
type coincided with her bid). Since money is undesirable in many applications (cf. the vast literature on
approximate mechanism design without money initiated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2013]) our main aim
here is to understand whether there are novel ways for the designer to exert control over the agents that can
reconcile approximation and OSP mechanisms with limited or no transfer of money.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
10
51
2v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
7 A
pr
 20
18
Our contribution. We introduce a model of probabilistic verification wherein the mechanism designer has
access to a (potentially faulty) verification device that she can use at runtime to check whether an agent has
lied or not. The device will catch the lie of the checked agent with certainty, or with a certain probability if
faulty. For example, whenever the type t of an agent is her location on the real line (as in facility location),
the designer can use a GPS logger to check whether the agent location is the same as her reported type
b. In our terminology, such a tool is faulty if its reading t′ of t is subject to some measurement error δ
and, therefore, the agent would be caught only if |b − t′| > δ; more generally, one could imagine different
tools that make mistakes in their measurements with some probability rather than in range (e.g., it gets
better as the difference between reported and real type increases). This notion generalizes and combines the
different notions of verification introduced in related literature, see, e.g., [Caragiannis et al., 2012, Penna and
Ventre, 2014] – a longer discussion on this aspect can be found in Section 2. With respect to monitoring,
the mechanism designer has in our probabilistic model a more general way to define fines for lying agents,
whilst, on the other hand, might have a faulty verification device.
We begin by studying what we call the full probabilistic verification model, wherein every agent is ver-
ifiable. and therefore there is a non-null probability of catching lies. We prove that, in this setting, it is
possible to obtain an OSP mechanism for every specific problem of interest; we essentially show that we can
always define verification probabilities and corresponding fines to make any lie obviously dominated. On
the technical level, we show that there is a trade-off between the kind of verification device needed (i.e., the
verification probabilities) and the amount of fines imposed to lying agents that are caught. Interestingly,
our results also imply that we can set the fines high enough to only verify a constant number of agents in
expectation.
The result above has two main limitations: firstly, it requires all the agents to be verifiable – this might
be impossible in some contexts (e.g., not all the agents might have been equipped with a GPS logger);
secondly, the fines might have a value that makes their enforceability doubtful (this is certainty the case for
the fines needed to guarantee a low number of verified agents). We therefore look at the partial probabilistic
verification model, where for some agents we cannot use any verification (and so the combination of fines
and probabilistic checks will not make lying obviously dominated). In the main technical contribution of
this work, we prove that there is a problem such that all ε-OSP mechanisms (i.e., agents will not deviate for
small gains ε) that solve this problem need to verify in expectation a linear number of agents. We focus on
the well studied public project problem [Jackson and Moulin, 1992] and identify a small domain for which
“many” agents need to be verified by any ε-OSP mechanism that solves the problem. This key result is
then leveraged to define instances where every ε-OSP mechanism for this problem needs to verify a linear
number of agents. Furthermore, this result is extended to ε-OSP mechanisms that solve the problem only
asymptotically (i.e., the solution returned by the mechanism gets closer to the right one as the number of
agents goes to infinity) and to ε-OSP Bayesian mechanisms (i.e., mechanism designer knows a prior on the
distribution of agents’ valuations); incidentally, as far as we know, this is one of the first results on OSP
mechanisms in the Bayesian setting – it is interesting to observe that, in this context, the prior does not give
any advantage to the designer of OSP mechanisms.
We finally prove that this result is essentially tight for ε-OSP in expectation mechanisms that implement
a social choice function asymptotically. In detail, we connect OSP with differential privacy and show how
the exponential mechanism of Nissim et al. [2012] can be implemented with partial probabilistic verification
to become ε-OSP in expectation and verify n− o(n) agents. Although the proofs basically follow the known
ones, we regard this result interesting for three main reasons (in addition to showing the tightness of the
lower bound). Firstly, it shows how, through verification, differential privacy can be related to OSP just like
truthfulness. Secondly, the mechanism becomes implementable not just in our probabilistic framework but
also with selective verification, a widely studied concept studied by economists and computer scientists (cf,
e.g., [Fotakis et al., 2016]). Thirdly, it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first instance of a mechanism
whose obvious strategyproofness is guaranteed in expectation over the random choices of the mechanism.
We actually need to extend the definition of Li [2017] to allow for this — we regard such a definition as an
important conceptual contribution of this work.
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2 Preliminaries
A mechanism design setting is defined by a set N of n selfish agents and a set of allowed outcomes S. Each
agent i has a type ti ∈ Di, where Di is called the domain of i. The type ti is usually assumed to be private
knowledge of agent i. Sometimes, it is possible that a distribution ∆i from which ti is drawn is known to
the designer : when this is the case, we say that we are in a Bayesian setting.1 In the rest of the paper,
we will always refer to the classical non-Bayesian setting, unless differently specified. Each selfish agent i is
equipped with a valuation function vi : Di × S → R. For ti ∈ Di and x ∈ S, vi(ti, x) is the valuation that
agent i has for outcome x when her type is ti. We will often use ti(x) as a shorthand for vi(ti, x). We say
that the domain Di of agent i is bounded if ti(x) ∈ [tinf , tsup] for all i, t ∈ Di, x ∈ S.
A mechanism is a process for selecting an outcome X ∈ S. Specifically, we can model it as an extensive
game form with consequences in S, represented by a tuple M = (H,≺, P,A,A, δc, (Ii)i∈N , g), where:
• H is a set of histories and ≺ is a partial order on H such that (H,≺) form an arborescence (i.e., a
directed tree with all edges pointing away from the root) of finite depth. We denote with h∅ the empty
history at the root of the arborescence, and with Z the set of terminal histories, that appear as leafs of
the arborescence. Moreover, we denote as σ(h) the set of successors of history h in the arborescence;
• P : H \ Z → N ∪ {c} is the player function, that determines at each history of the mechanisms which
player will take the next action, where c denotes a chance move, that is an action taken by the
mechanism without interacting with any agent;
• A is the set of all available actions that can be taken by the agents or by chance;
• A : H \Z → A is the action function that assigns to each history the set of actions that P (h) can take.
We require that A(h) is one-to-one with σ(h), i.e., to different histories immediately reachable from h
there must correspond different actions taken by the agent P (h) (e.g., if at history h the agent P (h)
plays and her available actions are only saying yes or no, then h has only two successors, h′ and h′′,
and a “yes” answer must lead to history h′ only, while a “no” answer must lead to history h′′ only);
• δc is the chance function, that is a probability distribution on the actions H available at histories h
such that P (h) = c. It serves to model random coin tosses of the mechanism;
• Ii is the collection of information sets of i, that is a partition of {h : P (h) = i}, i.e., the set of histories
in which i takes an action, such that A(h) = A(h′) for every h, h′ in the same cell of the partition,
and each action is available at only one information set; formally, for every pair of information sets
Ii, I
′
i ∈ Ii, if a ∈ A(Ii), then a /∈ A(I ′i), where A(Ii) = A(h) for any h ∈ Ii. Information sets are used
to model incomplete information by agents: whenever agent i who is called to take an action does
not know if she is at history h or at history h′ (e.g., because multiple agents are taking actions at the
same time), then we put h and h′ in the same information set Ii. Clearly, since these two histories are
indistinguishable, then it must be the case that the set of actions available in them must be exactly
the same. Moreover, for two distinct information sets it is without loss of generality to assign different
labels the actions available at these information sets;
• g : Z → S is the outcome function, and assigns to each terminal history an outcome.
Given a mechanism M, a strategy Si : Ii → A of agent i for this game assigns at each information set of
agent i an action among the ones available at that information set, i.e., Si(Ii) ∈ A(Ii) for every Ii ∈ Ii. Then
given a realization dc of δc, the strategy Si of agent i, and strategies S−i = (S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sn) for
every remaining player, we denote the corresponding terminal history of the game as z(dc, Si, S−i) and the
1Observe that in our Bayesian setting, the players are not aware of the prior. Thus, the OSP-ness of our mechanisms are
prior independent. A different meaning is sometimes used in literature for Bayesian mechanism design, wherein the prior also
modifies the definition of truthfulness.
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outcome of the mechanism as M(dc, Si, S−i) = g(z(dc, Si, S−i)). Then, a strategy Si is ε-weakly dominant
for a player of type ti if, for every realization dc
ti(M(dc, Si, S−i)) ≥ ti(M(dc, S′i, S−i))− ε
for every S′i and every S−i. Strategy Si is ε-weakly dominant in expectation for a player of type ti if
Edc∼δc [ti(M(dc, Si, S−i))] ≥ Edc∼δc [ti(M(dc, S′i, S−i))]− ε
for every S′i and every S−i.
Given two strategies Si and S
′
i, their earliest point of departure α(Si, S
′
i) is the collection of information
sets such that Si(Ii) 6= S′i(Ii) but there is S−i and dc such that Ii is reached both when the game is played
with strategies (Si, S−i, dc) and with strategies (S′i, S−i, dc). In this case, we say that (S−i, dc) witnesses
Ii being in α(Si, S
′
i). Given an information set Ii ∈ α(Si, S′i), we let W (Ii, Si, S′i) denote the set of pairs
(S−i, dc) that witness Ii being in α(Si, S′i). Then, a strategy Si is ε-obviously dominant for a player of type
ti if for every S
′
i and every Ii ∈ α(Si, S′i)
inf
(S−i,dc)∈W (Ii,Si,S′i)
ti(M(dc, Si, S−i)) ≥ sup
(S−i,dc)∈W (Ii,Si,S′i)
ti(M(dc, S′i, S−i))− ε.
That is, a strategy Si is ε-obviously dominant if whenever agent i must take an action, then, by taking the
one suggested by Si she achieves an utility that is at most ε far away from what she would achieve by taking
a different action, regardless of what other players will do from that time on.
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Figure 1: This arborescence describes the following mechanism: it first tosses a coin; if the coin lands on
head, then it interacts only once with agent i, otherwise it returns an outcome from S without any interaction
with agent i. Hence, in α(Si, S
′
i) there is only one information set, that in turn contains a single history
h, corresponding to the single node labeled i in the arborescence. However, this node can be only reached
if the coin lands on head. Thus, if agent i interacts with the mechanism, then she knows that realization
dc = T is impossible, and hence she can evaluate her utility by looking only at outcomes reachable in the
arborescence rooted at history h.
We next extend these concepts to define obvious dominance in expectation. We let Ŵ (Ii, Si, S
′
i) denote
the set S−i for which there is dc such that the pair (S−i, dc) witnesses Ii being in α(Si, S′i). Moreover, let
δc | (Ii, Si, S′i, S−i) be the probability on the realizations dc of δc conditioned on the pair (S−i, dc) witnessing
that Ii is in α(Si, S
′
i). We say that a strategy Si is ε-obviously dominant in expectation for a player of type
ti if for every S
′
i and every Ii ∈ α(Si, S′i)
inf
S−i∈Ŵ (Ii,Si,S′i)
Edc∼δ̂c [ti(M(dc, Si, S−i))] ≥ sup
S−i∈Ŵ (Ii,Si,S′i)
Edc∼δ̂c [ti(M(dc, S′i, S−i))]− ε
where δ̂c is used as a shorthand for δc | (Ii, Si, S′i, S−i). It is important to note that the conditioning of δc is
needed; as showed in Figure 2, there may be some randomized choices of the mechanism that do not allow
to reach a certain information set Ii.
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A mechanism designer would aim for each agent to select one specific strategy among the available ones
when her type is ti (e.g., the designer would like that agents bid truthfully in sealed bid auctions, and that
agents leave only when the current price is above their type in English auctions). We denote with Si(ti)
the strategy that the designer would expect agent i to play when her type is ti, and we say that Si(ti)
is signalling ti. Then, a mechanism is ε-strategy-proof (ε-SP) if for every i and every ti, strategy Si(ti)
is ε-weakly dominant2. If strategies Si(ti) are only ε-weakly dominant in expectation, then we say that
the mechanism is ε-SP in expectation. A mechanism is instead ε-obviously strategy-proof (ε-OSP) if for
every i and every ti, strategy Si(ti) is ε-obviously dominant. As above, if strategy Si(ti) is only ε-obviously
dominant in expectation, then the mechanism is said to be ε-OSP in expectation. Finally, a mechanism is
OSP if it is 0-OSP. Observe that if a mechanism is obviously strategy-proof (in expectation), then it is also
strategy-proof (in expectation).
With a slight abuse of notation, we write belowM(dc, (Si(bi))i) asM(dc,b), b = (b1, . . . , bn), to link the
outcome computed by the mechanism to the types of the agents more clearly. Moreover, for deterministic
mechanisms we omit dc. Given a social choice function f : D → S, where D = D1 × · · · × Dn is the set
of type profiles b, a mechanism M is said to implement f (in expectation, respectively) if M(b) = f(b)
(Edc∼δc [M(dc,b)] = f(b), respectively) for every b. M is instead said to implement f asymptotically (in
expectation, respectively) if limn→∞M(b) = f(b) (limn→∞Edc∼δc [M(dc,b)] = f(b), respectively).
Probabilistic verification. We introduce a general model of probabilistic verification, inspired by [Cara-
giannis et al., 2012, Penna and Ventre, 2014].
Fix i and b−i. Let t and t′ denote the true and reported type of agent i, respectively. A mechanism with
probabilistic verification M catches agent i lying with probability (1 − pit′,t(b−i)) and punishes the agent
caught lying with a fine F it′,t(b−i) > 0. (So p
i
t′,t(b−i) denotes the probability that the verification has not
worked – clearly, pit,t(b−i) = 0.) We drop i from the notation when this is clear from the context. We
follow the literature and assume that verification occurs after the outcome has been computed and executed;
therefore verification probabilities pit′,t(b−i) and fines F
i
t′,t(b−i) are actually also functions of M(t′,b−i).
Moreover, we assume that when a mechanism with probabilistic verification M catches agent i lying it
acquires knowledge of t(M(t′,b−i)). In some applications, the verification might actually be more powerful
and reveal more information about t (see Section 3 for an example).
Except for the fines, the mechanism does not use any other form of transfers. In this sense, our research
extends the literature on mechanisms that trade money with verification to ensure incentive-compatibility
(see, e.g., [Fotakis et al., 2017, Ferraioli et al., 2016]). When misreporting her type to a mechanism with
probabilistic verification, agent i will then have a valuation
t(M(t′,b−i))− (1− pit′,t(b−i))F it′,t(b−i).
There are two complementary interpretations of this formula, depending on the power of the verification
device that the mechanism designer has at her disposal. The first assumes that the verification device is
faulty (e.g., subject to measurement errors) and even if i is verified there is a chance that depends on type,
bid and what the others reported that she is not caught (e.g., error might depend on the “distance” between
t and t′). The second, instead, is closer to the selective verification of Fotakis et al. [2016] in that the device
is faultless and once an agent is selected to be verified by the mechanism she will be fined with certainty
if she lied. Naturally, as the mechanism has no knowledge of t, the probability with which the mechanism
selects agent i for verification can only depend, in this case, on her identity, report and bids of the others
but not on her type t; i.e., in the above formula pit′,t(b−i) reads p
i
t′(b−i).
We will consider two different categories of mechanisms with probabilistic verification: the full model
wherein all the agents are verifiable, so that we can define pit′,t(b−i) ∈ [0, 1] for every tuple (i, t, t′,b−i), and
the partial model wherein there exists at least one agent i that is not verifiable, that is, for which we require
pit′,t(b−i) = 1 for every b−i and every t, t
′ with t 6= t′. The non-verifiable agents might be given a priori
(e.g., agents without GPS loggers) or be determined by the designer’s limited resources (e.g., with k out of
n loggers available to allocate, there would remain n− k non-verifiable agents).
2For randomized mechanism, this concept is usually referred to as universally ε-strategy-proof.
5
Our model generalizes both the aforementioned models of Caragiannis et al. [2012] and Penna and Ventre
[2014]. The latter only focuses on degenerate ex-post verification probabilities (i.e., verification that depends
on the outcome computed by the mechanism) defined, for example, as follows:
pit′,t(b−i) =
{
1 if t(M(t′,b−i)) ≥ t′(M(t′,b−i))
0 otherwise
.
Moreover, the only fines imposed in [Penna and Ventre, 2014], for mechanisms with money, is the payment
that the mechanism would have awarded to the player caught lying. Subsequent literature, such as, [Krysta
and Ventre, 2015, Fotakis et al., 2017, Ferraioli et al., 2016], instead assumes that the fines are large enough
to make a verified lie very costly to the agents. We here maintain the ex-post nature of verification, but we
generalize both the definitions of fines and verification probabilities. The model in [Caragiannis et al., 2012]
is closer to ours in that probabilities and fines are not degenerate and restricted, respectively. However,
Caragiannis et al. [2012] use ex-ante verification and fines, that is, verification probabilities and fines that
do not depend on the outcome computed by the mechanism. In particular, for ex-ante verification, the
probabilities are type-only, i.e., pit′,t(b−i) only depends on t and t
′ and not on M(t′,b−i); furthermore, in
general, the verification step does not reveal any further information on the type/valuation of a lying agent.
Our example of a GPS logger in the introduction fits this type-only model as the probability of being caught
only depends on the distance between t and t′ but not on where the mechanism locates the facility and
how much the agent likes a certain outcome. On the one hand, this model is a special case of ours as we
can always disregard the outcome in our definition of the p’s and the F ’s. On the other hand, the ex-ante
paradigm is pretty limiting. For example, a mechanism with ex-ante fines and ex-ante verification might
need higher fines to ensure OSP (cf. our definition of fines in Propositions 3 and 4).
3 Full probabilistic verification
In this section we prove that full probabilistic verification is very powerful. Specifically, let C be the random
variable that denotes the expected number of agents that the mechanism is able to catch lying, i.e. C =∑n
i=1 Ci, where Ci = 1 if agent i is caught lying (thus with probability 1− pit′,t(b−i)), and 0 otherwise. We
then prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If the domains of agents are bounded, then for every social choice function f there is an OSP
mechanism with full probabilistic verification that implements f and verifies in expectation only a constant
number of agents, i.e., E[C] = O(1).
Hence, there are social choice functions for which an OSP mechanism is implementable in the full prob-
abilistic verification model but not implementable in the standard model with money (e.g., facility location
[Ferraioli and Ventre, 2017]).
Unfortunately, the mechanism that proves Theorem 1 needs very large fines. However, we prove that
full probabilistic verification still turns out to be a powerful tool even if large fines are not available. In
particular, we observe that the proof of Theorem 1 gives a trade-off between fines and the number of verified
agents. Hence, one may be able to work with lower fines, by simply having more accurate verification (in a
sense, we can reduce fines only if we spend more for our verification tools). Hence, we can show that if a lower
bound on the fines is given, it is possible, under opportune conditions, to compute verification probabilities
such that the resulting mechanism with full probabilistic verification is OSP. We also consider the opposite
direction. That is, we assume that verification probabilities are given, and investigate the lowest fines that
one needs to set in order to have an OSP mechanism. Hence, our results actually consider all the following
possible cases: (i) we are given bounded fines, and we need to decide how faulty we can allow the verification
device to be in order to have an OSP mechanism (cf. Lemma 2); (ii) the faultiness of the verification device
is given, and we need to set fines for the mechanism to be OSP (cf. Proposition 3); (iii) we require that the
expected number of verified agents is limited, and we design a corresponding OSP mechanism, by computing
both the necessary faultiness of the verification device and the fines (cf. Theorem 1).
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Whereas this bound can be in general very large, we show that there are some applications (including,
e.g., facility location) in which very large fines may be unnecessary.
OSP mechanism with few verified agents. For every i with true type t, let F iarg = argt,t′,b−i F
i
t′,t(b−i),
with arg ∈ {min,max}.
Lemma 2. For every social choice function f and fines F it′,t(b−i) such that F
i
min ≥ tsup − tinf for all i,
let MF be the mechanism with full probabilistic verification that requires agents to directly reveal their type
concurrently, implements f , uses fines F it′,t(b−i), and sets p
i
t′,t(b−i) =
tinf−tsup+F imin
F imax
. Then MF is OSP.
Proof. First observe that the mechanism is well defined since, by hypothesis, F imin ≥ tsup − tinf implies
pit′,t(b−i) ≥ 0 for every (i, t, t′,b−i). Moreover, since tinf < tsup and F imin ≤ F imax then we get pit′,t(b−i) < 1
for every (i, t, t′,b−i).
For OSP-ness, fix agent i. Since pit′,t(b
′
−i) < 1 for each (t, t
′,b′−i), then
1− pt′,t(b′−i) = 1−
tinf − tsup + F imin
F imax
=
(F imax − F imin) + (tsup − tinf)
(F imax − F imin) + F imin
≥ tsup − tinf
F imin
≥ tsup − tinf
F it′,t(b
′
−i)
,
where the first inequality follows since, for every C ≥ 0, C+xC+y ≥ xy whenever x ≤ y. The lemma then follows
since, for every b−i,
t(MF (t,b−i)) ≥ tinf = tsup − (1− pt′,t(b′−i))
tsup − tinf
1− pt′,t(b′−i)
≥ tsup − (1− pt′,t(b′−i))F it′,t(b′−i)
≥ t(MF (t′,b′−i))− (1− pt′,t(b′−i))F it′,t(b′−i).
Lemma 2 allows us to understand how the choice of F imin and F
i
max changes the probabilities. In particular,
how can we minimize the amount of verification needed or, equivalently, maximize pit′,t? The first observation
is that the probability pit′,t is higher when F
i
min = F
i
max = F . The subsequent observation is then that
the this probability quickly grows to 1 as F increases from tsup − tinf (simply look at the derivative of
(−tsup + tinf + x)/x): this shows that according to the choice of fines, there is a sort of all-or-nothing
verification (see Figure 2).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Set, for each (i, t, t′,b−i), F it′,t(b−i) = γ(tsup − tinf) for some γ > 1 that will be fixed
later, and let MF be the mechanism with full probabilistic verification that requires agents to to directly
reveal their type concurrently, implements f , sets pit′,t(b−i) =
tinf−tsup+F imin
F imax
, and uses fines F it′,t(b−i). Since
F imin = F
i
max = F
i
t′,t(b−i) ≥ tsup − tinf , then, according to Lemma 2, MF is OSP.
Moreover, given b−i and fines as above, this mechanism verifies
n∑
i=1
(1− pibi,ti(b−i)) = n−
n∑
i=1
tinf − tsup + F imin
F imax
= n−
n∑
i=1
(
1− 1
γ
)
=
n
γ
.
The theorem then follows by taking γ = Ω(n).
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Figure 2: Assume that tinf = 0, tsup = 1. Left figure shows that the value of p
i
t′,t(b−i) quickly grows to 1 as
the value of the fines increases: a fine smaller than 1 does not help at all and we need faultless verification.
Right figure shows the value of the fines as a function of the difference t(M(t′,b−i))− tinf and pimax.
OSP-ness for given verification probabilities. Fix i and let t be her true type. Let us denote pimax as
maxb−i,b∈Di pb,t(b−i). We prove the following result.
Proposition 3. For every social choice function f and verification probabilities p such that pit′,t(b−i) 6=
1 for all (i,b−i, t, t′), let Mp be the mechanism with full probabilistic verification that requires agents to
directly reveal their type concurrently, implements f , uses fines F it′,t(b−i) ≥ t(M(t
′,b−i))−tinf
1−pimax , and verification
probabilities p. Then Mp is OSP.
Proof. Fix i. Since pimax 6= 1, then
inf
b−i
t(Mp(t,b−i)) ≥ tinf
≥ sup
b−i
{
t(Mp(t′,b−i))− (1− pt′,t(b−i)) t(Mp(t
′,b−i))− tinf
1− pimax
}
≥ sup
b−i
{
t(Mp(t′,b−i))− (1− pt′,t(b−i))Ft′,t(b−i)
}
.
A close inspection to the proof reveals that our lower bounds on fines are tight, i.e., for any t, t′, i and b−i
there is no smaller F it′,t(b−i) that would guarantee OSP. This in particular means that once the probabilities
to verify have been set there is not much flexibility in the fines imposed on agents. Lower fines would only
be possible whenever the verification step would reveal not just the valuation for the implemented outcome
but more information about t and, consequently, more knowledge about the tuple (t(x))x∈S . For example,
in facility location, once we learn c = t(M(t′,b−i)) through verification, as we know that the location of
the facility is f =M((t′,b−i), we can conclude that the type t of the agent belongs to D′ = {f − c, f + c}.
When verification allows to know that t ∈ D′ ⊂ D we say that it is D′-revealing. Let D−i denote
Ś
j 6=iDj .
Proposition 3 can be adapted to prove the following one, where t′inf = inft∈D′,b−i∈D−i{t(M(t,b−i))}.
Proposition 4. For every social choice function f and verification probabilities p such that pit′,t(b−i) 6= 1
for all (i,b−i, t, t′), let Mˆp be the mechanism with full probabilistic D′-revealing verification that requires
agents to directly reveal their type concurrently, implements f , uses fines Fˆ it′,t(b−i) ≥ t(M(t
′,b−i))−t′inf
1−pimax , and
verification probabilities p. Then Mˆp is OSP.
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Since t′inf ≥ tinf , we have that Fˆ it′,t(b−i) ≤ F it′,t(b−i), and thus lower fines are sufficient to implement
OSP mechanisms with completely revealing verification.
4 Partial probabilistic verification
One limitation of Theorem 1 is that the fines have a very high value (linear in the number of agents)
which makes their enforceability doubtful. Looking at the proof, if the mechanism were able to verify a
constant number of agents, then the summation would only have a constant number of addends, γ would
in turn become a constant and, ultimately, the fines would be reduced significantly. In this section, we thus
investigate whether it is possible to obtain OSP mechanisms that verify few agents.
Specifically, we let V (b) denote the subset of verifiable agents for type profile b. Such a subset, just like
the outcome, can be chosen randomly and can depend on the declaration of the agents. Note that V (b) = n
in the full probabilistic verification model. Here, we consider partial probabilistic verification, and we ask
how large should V (b) be in order to have an OSP mechanism.
As in Proposition 3, for bounded domains we can guarantee through fines that, no matter the quality
of the verification device, truthtelling will be obviously dominant for all the agents in V (b). Therefore, the
mechanism “only” needs to obviously incentivize the agents that are not in V (b). We next prove the number
of these agents needs to be small for any OSP mechanism with partial probabilistic verification, even in the
case in which the designer can choose the agents to verify in V (b). In fact, we next show that for every ε > 0
there is a problem for which every ε-OSP mechanism needs to verify at least n− o(n) agents, where n is the
total number of agents. We also show that this result continues to hold even in the Bayesian setting and if
one requires to solve the problem only asymptotically. Finally, we prove that this bound is essentially tight:
indeed, for every ε > 0 there is an ε-OSP in expectation mechanism that is able to implement asymptotically
every social choice function, by verifying at most n− o(n) agents. Moreover, if the agents may be sometimes
imposed to adopt a given “reaction” to the output of the mechanism, then there is also an OSP in expectation
mechanism with the same features.
How many agents must be verified? Consider the following problem, known as public project problem.
We need to decide whether to implement or not a public project (e.g., building a bridge) whose cost is c.
The society is comprised of a set N of n individuals (also termed agents or customers) that we index with
integers from 0 to n− 1. The valuation of agent i if the project is implemented may be either vi(1) = 1 or
vi(1) = δ > 0, where, δ  1 (e.g., δ = 1n2 ). We say that the type of i is 1 in the first case, and δ otherwise.
Moreover, each agent has valuation vi(0) = 0 if the project is not implemented. The designer would like
to implement the project only if at least c individuals have type 1. In other words, the designer would like
to implement the public project function f that returns 1 if
∑
i vi(1) ≥ c, and 0 otherwise. This has been
introduced by Jackson and Moulin [1992] and it is a basic and very well studied problem in economics and
computer science (see, e.g., [Apt and Este´vez-Ferna´ndez, 2009] and references therein).
Consider an ε-OSP mechanism M that implements the public project function f and let t be a type
profile. Observe that ti can assume only two values: 1 and δ. Given type ti we will denote with ti the unique
alternative type. Let (Si(ti))i∈N be the profile of ε-obviously dominant strategies such that M((Si(ti))i) =
f(t) if the mechanism is deterministic, and Edc∼δc [M(dc, (Si(ti))i)] = f(t) otherwise. Given M, t, a
realization dc of δc and strategies (Si(ti))i, let ρ(i) be the first history h, if any, such that h can be reached
when the mechanism is played according to (dc, (Si(ti))i), P (h) = i, and every action a ∈ A(h) \ Si(ti)(h)
belongs to Si(ti)(h). In other words, ρ(i) is the first node, if any, in the path of the arborescence defined by
M, dc and strategies Si(ti), such that the agent i called to take an action at that node that either signals ti
or signals the alternative type ti. For this reason, we say that agent i reveals her type at ρ(i). Note that, in
general, ρ(i) might not exist for all the agents i, profiles t, realizations dc and strategies (Si(ti))i; for these
agents, we let ρ(i) be a dummy history h∗ such that h∗ ⊀ h for all histories h defined by M and no agent
takes actions at h∗. We will denote with ni and ki the number of agents that revealed their types, and the
ones that declared to have type 1, before i reveals her type, respectively. That is, ni = |{j : ρ(j) ≺ ρ(i)}|
and ki = |{j : ρ(j) ≺ ρ(i) and tj = 1}|.
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We now show a key property of this problem, that is enjoyed by every ε-OSP mechanism for this problem
and for every type profile.
Lemma 5. For every ε ∈ [0, 1) every type profile t, and every realization dc of δc, an ε-OSP mechanism that
implements the public project function has to verify every customer i with ni ≤ n+ ki− c− 1 and ki ≤ c− 2.
Moreover, if i takes an action according to Si(1) at ρ(i), then i must be verified even if ni = n + ki − c or
ki = c− 1.
Proof. Let us begin by observing that since the mechanism implements the public project function then if
ki ∈ [c+ ni − n, c− 1] then ρ(i) 6= h∗. In words, whenever the threshold c has not yet been reached and
there are still enough agents who have not revealed their type, the mechanism will need to keep querying
agents in order to establish its outcome.
Let us first suppose that i has type 1. If c+ni+1−n ≤ ki ≤ c−2, then Si(1) is not obviously dominant:
the worst outcome for i when she plays this strategy is achieved when no remaining individual reveals type
1, so that the mechanism’s outcome is 0 (since there are at most c − 1 customers with type 1), and this
outcome has value 0 for i; instead, by taking the action corresponding to Si(δ), the best outcome would
occur when at least c− ki among the remaining agents (that are n− ni − 1 ≥ c− ki) declare type 1, so that
the mechanism returns 1, by giving to i utility 1 > 0 + ε.
Hence, in order for the mechanism to be ε-OSP it is necessary to verify agent i if she takes action
according to Si(δ) at ρ(i) whenever ki ∈ [c+ ni + 1− n, c− 2]. A similar argument also can be adopted
when i’s type is δ, from which we achieve that, if the mechanism is ε-OSP, then the agent i that takes action
according to Si(1) at ρ(i) must be verified whenever ki ∈ [c+ ni − n, c− 1].
It is instructive to observe that if ki > c − 2 and ρ(i) 6= h∗ then it is obviously dominant for agent i
of type 1 to play according to strategy Si(1) at ρ(i). Indeed, since the mechanism implements the public
project function, it returns 1 in this case, and i will achieve her maximum possible utility, i.e., 1, regardless
of the actions of the others. Similarly, if the number of agents different from i whose type is still undefined
is not sufficient to reach the threshold c, i.e., n − ni − 1 < c − ki, then it is obviously dominant for i to to
play according to strategy Si(1), otherwise she will achieve the minimum possible utility, i.e., 0, regardless of
the actions of the remaining agents. A similar argument holds also for agent i of type δ whenever ρ(i) 6= h∗
and either ki > c − 1 or n − ni < c − ki. Hence, Lemma 5 is in a sense tight, since the customers that
it identities are the only ones that need to be verified in an ε-OSP mechanism that implements the public
project function.
Observe that ρ defines an order pi according to which agents reveal their type, such that pi(1) contains
all agents i such that ρ(j) ⊀ ρ(i) for every agent j, pi(2) contains all agents i such that ρ(j) ⊀ ρ(i) for
every agent j not in pi(1), and so on; pi is arbitrarily completed by the agents i such that ρ(i) = h∗. This
revelation order may be defined by the deterministic or randomized choices of the mechanism or by nature
(that is, the mechanism processes agents as they come)3. Lemma 5 proves that the number of verified agents
depends only on this revelation order. For this reason, we will from now on focus only on this order and
we will forget the other details of the mechanism. In particular, we will say that the record at time t ≥ 1
is Rt = ((pi(1),bpi(1)), . . . , (pi(t),bpi(t))), where for a subset of agents S ⊆ N , bS = (bi)i∈S . We will denote
with Rt the set of all possible records at time t and with N t−1pi =
⋃
j<t pi(j) the set of agents that revealed
their type before time t. Moreover we set R0 = R0 = ∅. A selection rule σ = (σ1, . . . , σl), l ≤ n, where
each σt : Rt−1 → ∆(2N ), associates to each possible record Rt−1 a probability distribution σt(Rt−1) over the
subsets of agents in N \ N t−1pi . Roughly speaking, the selection rule specifies how the mechanism (nature,
resp.) selects the next players to reveal their type. This definition allows us to represent every selection rule,
even adaptive ones (in which players are selected based also on the type revealed by previous agents). In
what follows, we focus on selection rules defined (defined by nature and faced, respectively) by of an ε-OSP
mechanism with bounded approximation ratio.
3Unless differently specified, we do not make any difference about this feature and our results hold no matter the source of
this order.
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Given c and a selection rule σ, for a type profile t such that |{i : ti = 1}| = c, we let τσ,c(t) be the random
variable that measures the number of agents that have been verified by the mechanism on type profile t.
When clear from the context, we omit c from the subscript.
We begin by observing that if a selection rule selects more than one agent to reveal their type at the
same time, then it can only reach the thresholds of Lemma 5 later than the selection rule wherein the
revelation order is serialized. So, serialization cannot increase the number of verified customers. Moreover,
as highlighted in [Bade and Gonczarowski, 2017, Mackenzie, 2017], serialization does not affect the OSP-ness
of the mechanism. Thus, we have the following observation.
Observation 6. Fix ε ∈ [0, 1), t > 0 and a record Rt−1. Let σ be a selection rule of an ε-OSP mechanism
that implements the public project function, such that σt(Rt−1) assigns non-zero probability to a subset of
agents A with |A| ≥ 2. Then there is an alternative ε-OSP mechanism that implements the public project
function with selection rule σ′ such that σ′t(Rt−1) assigns non-zero probability only to singletons of agents,
and for every type profile t it holds that E[τσ(t)] ≥ E[τσ′(t)].
The uniform selection rule U returns, for every t and for every record, the uniform distribution over
agents that have not yet revealed their type. Next we show that for every selection rule σ there is an
instance t in which σ performs worse than the uniform selection rule, in terms of the expected number of
agents verified E[τσ(t)].
Lemma 7. For ε ∈ [0, 1), c > 0 and selection rule σ for an ε-OSP mechanism that implements the public
project function, there is t s.t. |{i : ti = 1}| = c and E[τσ(t)] ≥ E[τU (t)].
Proof. According to Observation 6, we can assume without loss of generality that at each time step σ assigns
positive probability only to singletons.
Let P be the uniform distribution on the type profiles t such that |{i : ti = 1}| = c, i.e. P (t) =((
n
c
)
(n− c)!c!) if |{i : ti = 1}| = c and P (t) = 0 otherwise. Observe that, for every t, every Rt−1, and
for agent i selected at time t,
Pr
P
(ti = 1 | Rt−1) = c− ki
n− ni . (1)
We prove by induction on i = 1, . . . , n that Et∼P [τσ(tN\Nn−ipi ) | Rn−i] ≥ Et∼P [τU (tN\Nn−ipi ) | Rn−i] for
every Rn−i (and thus tNn−ipi ). Then, since R0 = ∅, we have that Et∼P [τσ(t)] ≥ Et∼P [τU (t)]. The lemma
follows because it must exist t? such that |{i : t?i = 1}| = c and E[τσ(t?)] ≥ E[τU (t?)].
The base case is i = 1. Observe that for every selection rule exactly the same agent will reveal her type,
namely, the only one that has not revealed her type in Rn−1. For the given record Rn−1 ∈ Rn−1, let k
denote the number of agents who declared 1. It must be that either k = c or k = c − 1 (since we are only
considering profiles with exactly c agents with type 1). According to Lemma 5, in the first case the last agent
must not be verified, whereas in the last case it is necessary to verify the last agent only if she declares 1.
However, since this choice is independent from the selection rule and from tNn−1pi , the claim trivially holds.
Assume that the claim holds for i−1 (i.e., for every Rn−i+1 we have that Et∼P [τσ(tN\Nn−i+1pi ) | Rn−i+1] ≥
Et∼P [τU (tN\Nn−i+1pi ) | Rn−i+1]). We prove it also for i.
Consider a record Rn−i. If at least c agents declaring type 1 have revealed her type, or the number of
those whose type is still unknown is too low for reaching the threshold c, then no further verification needs
to be made regardless of the selection rule adopted in the remaining steps. Hence, the claim trivially holds.
If instead k ≤ c− 1 customers declared 1 and there are exactly c− k agents whose type is unknown, then for
every t such that |{i : ti = 1}| = c, it will occur that all remaining agents have type 1 and thus, according
to Lemma 5 they must be all verified, regardless of the order in which they are selected. Hence, the claim
trivially holds. Consider now the case that k ≤ c − 1 customers declared 1 and there are p ≥ c − k + 1
agents that have not yet revealed her type. If σn−i+1(Rn−i) = U(Rn−i), then the claim directly follows
from the inductive hypothesis. Otherwise, let S = N \Nn−ipi . Since, by Lemma 5 the agent selected at the
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(n− i+ 1)-th time step will be surely verified, the expected number of agents verified is
Et∼P [τσ(tN\Nn−ipi ) | Rn−i] = 1 +
∑
z∈S
σn−i+1(Rn−i)(z)
·
∑
β∈{δ,1}
Pr
P
(bz = β)Et∼P [τσ(tN\Nn−ipi ) | Rn−i ∪ (z, β)].
By using that the mechanism is ε-OSP, we achieve that
Et∼P [τσ(tN\Nn−ipi ) | Rn−i] = 1 +
∑
z∈S
σn−i+1(Rn−i)(z)
·
∑
β∈{δ,1}
Pr
P
(tz = β)Et∼P [τσ(tN\Nn−ipi ) | Rn−i ∪ (z, β)].
Moreover, from the inductive hypothesis, it follows that
Et∼P [τσ(tN\Nn−ipi ) | Rn−i] ≥ 1 +
∑
z∈S
σn−i+1(Rn−i)(z)
·
∑
β∈{δ,1}
Pr
P
(tz = β)Et∼P [τU (tN\Nn−ipi ) | Rn−i ∪ (z, β)].
Observe that, by anonymity of the uniform selection rule, E[τU (t) | Rt] depends only on the number of
agents that declared type 1 in Rt and not on their identities. That is, E[τU (t) | Rt] = E[τU (t) | κ], if in Rt
only κ agents declared 1. Hence, and according to (1), we have
Et[τσ(tN\Nn−ipi ) | Rn−i] = 1+(
p− c+ k
p
Et[τU (tN\Nn−ipi ) | k]+
c− k
p
Et[τU (tN\Nn−ipi ) | k + 1]
)∑
z∈S
σn−i+1(Rn−i)(z).
Then
∑
z∈S σn−i+1(Rn−i)(z) = 1 =
∑
z∈S U(z) implies Et∼P [τσ(tN\Nn−ipi ) | Rn−i] = Et∼P [τU (tN\Nn−ipi ) |
Rn−i].
We can now state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 8. For all ε-OSP mechanisms implementing the public project function, with ε ∈ [0, 1), there is
an instance on which the mechanism verifies in expectation n− o(n) agents.
Proof. Let c = 1 +
√
n− 1. We next show that if the mechanism adopts the uniform selection rule, then for
every t such that |{i : ti = 1}| = c, E[τU (t)] ≥ n − o(n). The theorem then follows by merging this result
with Lemma 7. Observe indeed that
E[τU (t)] ≥ (n− c− 1) · (1− Pr(τU (t) < n− c− 1))
= (n− o(n)) (1− Pr(τU (t) < n− c− 1)) .
We next prove that Pr(τU (t) < C) = o(1), concluding in this way the proof. For τU (t) to be less than
n− c− 1 it must be the case that c− 1 customers with value 1 have been selected among the first n− c− 2
agents that revealed her type. Indeed, since a mechanism that implements the public project function must
reveal the type of all agents until either c agents have declared to have type 1 or the number of agents whose
type is unknown is insufficient to reach this threshold, then the (n− c− 1)-th agent must necessarily reveal
her type, and by Lemma 5 it must be verified. Observe that there are
(
n−c−2
c−1
)
revealing orders so that this
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property is satisfied among the
(
n
c
)
orders in which the c customers with type 1 can reveal it. Since we are
using the uniform selection rule, these arrangements have the same probability, and thus
Pr(τU (t) < n− c− 1) =
(
n−c−2
c−1
)(
n
c
)
=
(n− c− 2)!
(c− 1)!(n− 2c+ 1)! ·
c!(n− c)!
n!
= c · (n− c− 2)!
(n− 2c+ 1)! ·
(n− c)!
n!
= c ·
∏c−1
i=1 (n− c+ 1− i)∏c−1
i=0 (n− i)
=
c
n
·
c−1∏
i=1
n− c+ 1− i
n− i =
c
n
·
c−1∏
i=1
(
1− c− 1
n− i
)
≤ c
n
(
1− c− 1
n− 1
)c−1
=
1 +
√
n− 1
n
(
1− 1√
n− 1
)√n−1
≤ 1 +
√
n− 1
en
= o(1).
We will next show that this theorem can be extended in order to work even if we have weaker constraints.
Specifically, we prove that the result holds even in the Bayesian setting (Proposition 9), i.e., if the mechanism
designer knows the distribution from which the agents’ types are drawn, or it holds if we only require that
the mechanism implements the public project function only asymptotically (Proposition 10).
We focus first on the Bayesian setting.
Proposition 9. For every ε-OSP mechanism implementing the public project function in the Bayesian
setting, with ε ∈ [0, 1), there is an instance for which the mechanism verifies in expectation n− o(n) agents.
Proof. Consider an instance in which each agent has the same probability p of having type 1. By symmetry
of agents, the order pi in which agent reveal their type cannot depend on this prior. Moreover, since the
mechanism implements the public project function, each agent must reveal her type at some time as long as
either c agents have declared to have type 1 or the number of agents whose type is unknown is insufficient
to reach this threshold.
Without loss of generality, we rename the agents so that an agent with lower index is scheduled before
an agent with higher index. That is, i < j implies that ni ≤ nj . It then follows that ni ≤ i.
Let us define the random variable Xi that assumes value 1 if the customer i is verified, and 0 otherwise.
Observe that X =
∑
iXi is the number of verified customers. By Lemma 5, the expected number of verified
agents is
E [X] =
n−1∑
i=0
Pr(Xi = 1)
≥
n−1∑
i=0
Pr (ki ∈ [c+ ni + 1− n, c− 2]) .
If i ≤ n− c− 1, then c+ ni + 1− n ≤ 0. Hence, we have Pr (ki ∈ [c+ ni + 1− n, c− 2]) = Pr (ki ≤ c− 2).
Since Pr (ki ≤ c− 2) = 1 if ni ≤ c− 2, and thus for at least the first c− 1 customers that revealed her type,
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we then have
E [X] ≥
n−c−1∑
i=0
Pr (ki ≤ c− 2)
≥ c− 1 +
n−c−1∑
i=c
Pr (ki ≤ c− 2 | ni ≥ c− 1)
(2)
Hence, we achieve that
Pr (ki ≤ c− 2 | ni ≥ c− 1) =
c−2∑
j=0
Pr (ki = j | ni ≥ c− 1) =
c−2∑
j=0
(
ni
j
)
pj(1− p)ni−j =
(1− p)ni ·
c−2∑
j=0
1
j!
ni!
(ni − j)!
(
p
1− p
)j
=
(1− p)ni ·
1 + c−2∑
j=1
1
j!
ni!
(ni − j)!
(
p
1− p
)j ≥
(1− p)ni .
(3)
Let ρi =
1
p . It is well-known that
(
1 + 1x
)x
< e <
(
1 + 1x−1
)x
, from which we have that
(1− p)ni =
(
1− 1
ρi
)ni
> e
− niρi−1 > 1− ni
ρi − 1 = 1−
nip
1− p .
If p = gg+(n−c−1)2 ≤ gg+ni(n−c−1) for some g = o(n), then it is easy to see that
(1− p)ni > 1− nip
1− p ≥ 1−
g
n− c− 1 . (4)
By putting together (2), (3), and (4), we can conclude that the mechanism must verify at least n−c−1−o(n)
customers. The theorem then follows by taking c = o(n).
We now extend Theorem 8 in order to work even with mechanisms that implement the public project
problem only asymptotically.
Proposition 10. For every ε ∈ [0, 1) and for every ε-OSP mechanism that implements the public project
function asymptotically, there is an instance for which the mechanism must verify in expectation n − o(n)
agents.
Proof. Let c = 1+
√
n− 1. We next show that the probability that the mechanisms verifies at most n−c−1
agents is o(1). Note that, differently from the case of mechanisms implementing exactly the desired social
choice function, there may be two reasons for which a non-exact mechanism verifies at most n− c−1 agents:
either c − 1 with type 1 are found among the first n − c − 1 agents, or the mechanism reveals the type of
less than n− c of them. Theorem 8 proves that the first event occurs only with negligible property. We next
show that this is the case even for the second one.
As above, let X be the random variable that measures the number of verified agents. Moreover, let Ei be
the event in which the mechanism has not seen c agents with type 1 after at least i+ 1 agents that revealed
14
the type. Then,
Pr(X ≤ n− c− 1) =
Pr(X ≤ n− c− 1 | E¯n−c−1) · Pr(E¯n−c−1)
+ Pr(X ≤ n− c− 1 | En−c−1) · Pr(En−c−1)
≤ o(1) + Pr(X ≤ n− c− 1 | En−c−1),
where the inequality follows from Pr(E¯n−c−1) = o(1), as shown in the proof of Theorem 8. The theorem
follows by proving that Pr(X ≤ n− c− 1 | En−c−1) = o(1).
Suppose that this is not the case, and Pr(X ≤ n − c − 1 | En−c−1) = Ω(1). Note that by definition
of En−c−1, the mechanism terminates before knowing whether there are at least c agents with type 1.
Let us suppose that the mechanism decides to not implement the project in this case. Consider then an
instance t with exactly c agents with type 1. Observe that in this case the mechanism does not implement
the project whenever it stops after n − c − 1 agents revealed the type, and the c agents with type 1 are
not found among these. That is, the mechanism returns the wrong outcome with probability at least
Pr(X ≤ n − c − 1 | En−c−1) · Pr(En−c−1) ≥ Ω(1) · (1 − o(1)) = Ω(1). But this contradicts the assumption
that the mechanism implements the public project function asymptotically.
Tightness of the bound. For a social choice function f , the sensitivity of f is the smallest integer d such
that for every i, every ti, t
′
i ∈ Di, every t−i ∈ D−i, and every s.
|f((ti, t−i), s)− f((t′i, t−i), s)| ≤
d
n
.
Fix c = o(n) and ε > 0 such that 4dcε = o(n) and let β =
nε
2dc .
Consider the β-Exponential Mechanism with Partial Verification Mβ : ask agents to reveal their type in
sequential order; given a declaration profile b ∈ D, choose the outcome s` ∈ S= {s1, . . . , s|S|} according to
the probability distribution
Mβb (s`) =
eβf(b,s`)∑
z∈S eβf(b,z)
; 4 (5)
for the first n− c agents, verify if their declared type bi coincides with their real type ti.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 11. For every social choice function f , if |S| ≤ eo(n), then the β-Exponential Mechanism with
Partial Verification is 2ε-OSP in expectation and it implements f asymptotically.
The proof follows from the following lemmas.
Lemma 12. The β-Exponential Mechanism with Partial Verification is 2ε-OSP in expectation.
The proof mimics Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in [Nissim et al., 2012].
Proof. The claim obviously hold for every agent selected among the first n−c, since an untruthful bid would
be discovered by the verification; as from above, we can then use fines to obviously discourage this misreport.
We will next show that for every agent i not selected among the first c, any type ti, and any two bid
profiles b = (bi,b−i) and b′ = (ti,b′−i) such that bj = b
′
j = tj for each agent j 6= i among the first n − c
4This is equivalent to saying that the mechanism chooses dc according to the distribution U(0, 1], i.e., the uniform distribution
on (0, 1], and returns s` whenever dc ∈
(∑
j<`M
β
b (sj),
∑
j<`M
β
b (sj) +M
β
b (s`)
]
. This formulation would be coherent with
the terminology adopted throughout the paper but undoubtedly be more complex.
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agents, it holds that
Es∼Mβb [vi(ti, s)]− Es∼Mβb′ [vi(tis)] ≤ 2ε.
5
The lemma then follows.
To this aim, let us first prove that the probability that Mβ returns s does not change too much, regardless
the bid profile in input. Indeed, since f is d-sensitive and (bi,b−i) and (ti,b′−i) differ in at most c positions,
then f((bi,b−i), z)− cdn ≤ f((ti,b′−i), z) ≤ f((bi,b−i), z) + cdn for every z ∈ S. Hence,
Mβb (s)
Mβb′(s)
=
eβf((bi,b−i),s)∑
z∈S e
βf((bi,b−i),z)
e
βf((ti,b
′−i),s)∑
z∈S e
βf((ti,b
′−i),z)
≤
eβf((bi,b−i),s)∑
z∈S e
βf((bi,b−i),z)
eβ(f((bi,b−i),s)−
cd
n
)∑
z∈S e
β(f((bi,b−i),z)+ cdn )
≤ eε,
where the last inequality follows from our choice of β.
Hence, we have that
Es∼Mβb [vi(ti, s)] =
∑
s∈S
vi(ti, s)M
β
b (s)
≤ eε ·
∑
s∈S
vi(ti, s)M
β
b′(s)
= eε · Es∼Mβ
b′
[vi(ti, s)].
Then
Es∼Mβb [vi(ti, s)]− Es∼Mβb′ [vi(ti, s)]
≤ (eε − 1)Es∼Mβ
b′
[vi(ti, s)]
≤ eε − 1 ≤ 2ε,
where the last inequalities follows because vi(ti, s) ∈ [0, 1] for every s and eε− 1 ≤ 2ε for every ε ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 13. If |S| ≤ eo(n), then the β-Exponential Mechanism with Partial Verification implements f
asymptotically.
The proof mimics Lemma 3 in Nissim et al. [2012].
Proof. Consider n such that β|S| > e (i.e., n > 2edcε|S| ) and let δ = log β|S|β . Observe that, by our choice of n,
log β|S| > log e = 1, and, consequently, we have that δ ≥ 1β > 0.
For every type profile t and every bad outcome s ∈ S˜ = {s˜ ∈ S : f(t, s) < maxz f(t, z)− δ}, we have that
Mβt (s) =
eβf(t,s)∑
z∈S eβf(t,z)
≤ e
β(maxz f(t,z)−δ)
eβmaxz f(t,z)
= e−βδ.
5Observe that, since the random choice of the mechanism is only done at a terminal node, then for every agent i, for every
pair of strategies Si = Si(bi) = bi, S
′
i = Si(b
′
i) = b
′
i, for every Ii ∈ α(Si, S′i) and every S−i = (Sj(bj))j 6=i ∈ Ŵ (Ii, Si, S′i), we
have that (S−i, dc) witnesses that Ii ∈ α(Si, S′i) for every realization dc. In other words, δc | (Ii, Si, S′i, S−i) = δc, and thus
Edc∼δc|(Ii,Si,S′i,S−i)[vi(ti,M
β(dc,b))] = Edc∼U(0,1][vi(ti,Mβ(dc,b))] = Es∼Mβ
b
[vi(ti, s)]
for every bi, b
′
i and b−i.
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Thus, Mβt (S˜) =
∑
s∈S˜M
β
t (s) ≤ |S˜|e−βδ ≤ |S|e−βδ. In turn, this implies that with probability at least
1− |S|e−βδ the mechanism returns an outcome s such that f(s) ≥ maxz f(t, z)− δ. Then,
Es∼Mβt [f(t, s)] ≥
(
max
z
f(t, z)− δ
) (
1− |S|e−βδ)
≥ max
z
f(t, z)− δ − |S|e−βδ,
where in the last inequality we used that f(t, z) ∈ [0, 1]. By substituting δ in the above equation, we have
Es∼Mβt [f(t, s)] ≥ maxz f(t, z)−
log β|S|
β
− 1
β
≥ max
z
f(t, z)− 2 log β|S|
β
.
Thus, the mechanism Mβ has, in expectation, an additive approximation of 2 log β|S|β = 4dcnε log nε|S|2dc , that is
on(1) since
4dc
ε = o(n) and |S| ≤ eo(n).
We next show that we can extend, under opportune conditions, the theorem above to prove the existence
of a strictly OSP in expectation mechanism that implements asymptotically every social choice function f
whenever the mechanism is able to limit the way an agent reacts to the announced outcome.
Tight OSP in expectation imposing mechanism. Note that every direct-revelation mechanism can
be phrased as follows: First, the designer collects bids b from agents. Then, it proposes an outcome s to
agents. Finally, agents react to the proposed outcome. E.g., in an auction, when the auctioneer proposes
a price, the agent may accept to buy the good at that price, or refuse. Similarly, in facility location, the
auctioneer decides the location of facilities, whereas the agent reacts by choosing the closest facility. The
utility vi of the player i will then depend on her type ti, the proposed outcome s, and the reaction ri. I.e.,
vi(ti, s) = vi(ti, s, ri). A reaction r
∗
i (ti, s) is said to be optimal for agent i of type ti at s if it maximizes the
valuation of i when the proposed outcome is s. I.e., r∗i (ti, s) = arg maxr vi(ti, s, r). A mechanism is imposing
if it forces the reaction of agent i declaring bi to be r
∗
i (bi, s), i.e., the optimal reaction according to the
declared bid. For example, an auction is imposing if the agent cannot refuse to buy the item if the proposed
price is below her declaration; a mechanism for facility location is imposing if it does not allow an agent to use
a facility different from the one that is closest to agent’s declared position. Hence, in an imposing mechanism,
if the bid of agent i is bi, then vi(ti, s) = vi(ti, s, r
∗
i (bi, s)) for every i, ti, s. Moreover, observe that for every
i, every ti, and every s, by definition of optimal reaction, we have that vi(ti, s, r
∗
i (ti, s)) ≥ vi(ti, s, r∗i (bi, s)).
We will next prove that, for every social choice function f , there is an imposing mechanism with partial
probabilistic verification that implements f asymptotically and is strictly OSP in expectation. To this aim,
set γ(i, ti, bi) = maxs vi(ti, s, r
∗
i (ti, s))−vi(ti, s, r∗i (bi, s)), and denote the outcome achieving this maximum as
s(i, ti, bi) = arg maxs vi(ti, s, r
∗
i (ti, s))− vi(ti, s, r∗i (bi, s)). Moreover, set γ = mini,ti,bi 6=ti γ(i, ti, bi). If γ = 0,
then it means that reactions do not influence the players utility, and hence imposing a reaction cannot have
effect on the mechanism. For this reason, we will consider henceforth on a setting (n,D,S, (vi)i∈[n]) for
which γ > 0.
Consider a social choice function f with sensitivity d and let γ as defined above. Let ε =
√
γd
|S|n
√
log nγ2d ,
c = o
(√
n
|S| logn
)
≥ 1, and q = 2|S|εγ . Let P be the probability distribution that assigns probability 1|S| to
each s ∈ S. We define the imposing mechanismMβ,P as follows: ask agents to reveal the type in sequential
order; for each agent i in the first n− c agents, we verify if her declared type bi coincides with her real type
ti; given a declaration profile b ∈ D, then, with probability 1 − q choose the outcome s ∈ S according to
probability distribution Mβb as defined in (5), with β =
nε
2dc , and with the remaining probability choose the
outcome according to probability distribution P .
Let n0 be the smallest integer such that n0 ≥ 8d|S|γ log γ2d and n0logn0 >
8d|S|
γ . We the have the following
theorem, whose proof mimics Theorem 2 in [Nissim et al., 2012]
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Theorem 14. For every social choice function f , if n > n0 and |S| = o(n), thenMβ,P is OSP in expectation,
it verifies at most n− o(n) agents and it implements f asymptotically.
Proof. The fact thatMβ,P verifies at most n−o(n) agents follows directly from the definition and our choice
for c. Moreover, in [Nissim et al., 2012, Lemma 5], it is proved that if n > n0, then
qγ
|S| ≥ 2ε. Therefore,
from Lemma 12 and since
Es∼P [vi(ti, s, r∗i (ti, s))] ≥ Es∼P [vi(ti, s, r∗i (bi, a))] +
γ
|S| ,
it follows thatMβ,P is strictly OSP in expectation. Finally, let Mβ,Pt = (1− q)Mβt + qP be the distribution
from which Mβ,P draws the outcome. We then have that
Es∼Mβ,Pt [f(t, s)] = (1− q)Es∼Mβt [f(t, s)] + qEs∼P [f(t, s)] ≥ Es∼Mβt [f(t, s)].
As shown in the proof of Lemma 13, we have that
Es∼Mβt [f(t, s)] ≥ maxz f(t, z)−
4dc
nε
log
nε|S|
2dc
≥ max
z
f(t, z)− 4dc
nε
log
nε|S|
2d
.
Moreover, since maxz f(t, z) ≤ 1 and q = 2|S|εγ < 1, we have that
Es∼Mβt [f(t, s)] ≥ maxz f(t, z)− q −
4dc
nε
log
nε|S|
2d
≥ max
z
f(t, z)− 2|S|ε
γ
− 4dc
nε
log
nγ
2d
.
By substituting ε in the above equation, we have
Es∼Mβt [f(t, s)] ≥ maxz f(t, z)− (4c+ 2)
√
d|S|
γn
√
log
nγ
2d
= max
z
f(t, z)− on(1),
where the last step follows from our hypothesis on |S| and our choice for c.
5 Conclusions
Li [2017] proved that OSP is the “right” definition of truthfulness for a kind of “bounded rational” agents,
where the kind of bounded rationality (i.e., those who have limited who lack contingent reasoning skills) is
exactly the one observed in many experimental settings. This makes it interesting to investigate what can
and cannot be done with these partially rational agents, and how these limits can be addressed (e.g., can
verification help?). This motivates ours and most of recent work on the topic [Bade and Gonczarowski, 2017,
Ferraioli and Ventre, 2017]. It would still be interesting to investigate mechanism design for other (possibly,
less stringent) notions of bounded rationality.
In Section 4, we focused on the binary public project problem. The simplicity of this problem, in our
opinion, has two advantages: firstly, it makes our result stronger, since we are giving a negative result;
secondly, it improves the readability of the proof, since we do not need to deal with the complexities of the
problem. However, a detailed look at our proof highlights that we uses the structure of the problem only
to prove that: (i) one needs to verify almost every agent that reveal her type until you find a solution; (ii)
there is an instance for which it is highly unlikely to find a solution after only few agents revealed her type.
It is not hard then to see that these properties are enjoyed not only by the public project problem, but also
by its combinatorial counterpart [Buchfuhrer et al., 2010, Dughmi, 2011] and many other different problems
(e.g., facility location). It would, however, be interesting to find settings in which an OSP mechanism with
partial probabilistic verification exists that verifies only few agents.
Finally, we proved that an ε-OSP in expectation mechanism with partial probabilistic verification that
implements a social choice function f asymptotically and verifies at most n− o(n) agents always exists. We
also proved that we can also turn the mechanism above in one that is strictly OSP in expectation if we focus
on imposing mechanism. However, it would be interesting to understand: (i) whether reactions’ imposition
is necessary, or whether there is a non-imposing OSP mechanism with the desired properties; (ii) whether
ε-OSP deterministic mechanism exists with the desired properties.
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